Managing Defeat: Why Mexico’s War on Cartels Is Lost from Within

The war on drugs has become a war of simulations. The cartels adapt, scale, and evolve. The Mexican state drifts.

By Ghaleb Krame

General Context

Since the Mexican government declared war on the cartels in 2006, more than 460,000 people have been killed in cartel-related violence (CFR, 2025). Nearly two decades later, the violence has intensified rather than diminished. In 2025, security reports from the DEA and ACLED confirm that Mexico’s two dominant cartels—the Sinaloa Cartel and the Jalisco New Generation Cartel (CJNG)—have territorial presence in all 32 states and exert control over approximately one-third of the country (Diario de Yucatán, 2025; ACLED, 2025).

The July 2024 arrest of Ismael “El Mayo” Zambada—long considered the stabilizing figure of the Sinaloa Cartel—triggered a violent rift between factions: Los Chapitos and Los Mayitos (ACLED, 2025). This internal power vacuum has allowed the CJNG to expand into new regions and consolidate power. In this context, one hypothesis becomes inescapable: as long as collusion persists between cartels and the Mexican state, the war is already lost from within. Structural corruption grants cartels political cover, logistical freedom, and legal impunity.

Systemic Corruption: Not a Bug, but a Design Feature

Corruption is not an anomaly—it is the operational foundation of Mexico’s failure to dismantle organized crime. The conviction of Genaro García Luna, Mexico’s former Secretary of Public Security, in a U.S. federal court for accepting bribes from the Sinaloa Cartel (NYT, 2024), and the arrest of General Salvador Cienfuegos, accused of protecting the H-2 cartel (NYT, 2022), show how deeply organized crime has penetrated the upper echelons of government.

A 2022 leak of internal defense communications, later verified by NPR, revealed systematic collusion between military commanders and drug trafficking groups (NPR, 2022). These are not isolated scandals. They are systemic mechanisms that allow cartels to operate as parallel power structures.

The Criminal Model: Adaptive, Scalable, and Ruthlessly Efficient

According to a Science (2023) study, cartel recruitment has surged from 115,000 members in 2012 to an estimated 180,000 by 2022, absorbing 350–370 new recruits per week). Recruits include children, marginalized youth, and army deserters. This model of replenishment ensures uninterrupted operational continuity.

The Zetas—originally composed of elite military defectors—pioneered the integration of advanced tactical warfare into cartel strategy. Now CJNG and others emulate this structure, employing encrypted communications, explosive drones, paramilitary formations, and decentralized command cells (ACLED, 2025; BBC, 2024). Meanwhile, Mexico’s state response remains bogged down in bureaucracy and slow institutional reflexes.

Comparative Table: State vs Cartel Capabilities

This structural imbalance explains why cartels remain not just resilient—but ascendant (Vision of Humanity, 2025; Foreign Affairs, 2025).

Reform Proposals: Breaking the State–Cartel Nexus

To dismantle the entrenched system of corruption, impunity, and organized crime-state collusion, six core reforms are proposed as part of a strategic institutional transformation:

• Integrity and Trustworthiness Exams Audited by Citizens with International Oversight

Building on the Global Initiative’s approach to anti-corruption and institutional reform, it is proposed that all elected and judicial officials undergo mandatory integrity and trustworthiness assessments. These evaluations would include asset analysis, psychosocial profiling, and environmental risk assessments. They would be administered by citizen oversight councils and audited by international bodies such as Transparency International, the OAS/MESICIC, or UNODC (Global Initiative, 2025).

• Creation of a National Anti-Corruption Agency (ANA)

An autonomous, constitutionally based agency is proposed, empowered to investigate, prosecute, and sanction corruption at all levels of government. Backed by international organizations such as the OAS and UNODC, the ANA would focus on dismantling political-criminal networks while remaining protected from domestic interference.

• Criminal Audit of Campaign and Political Party Financing

A specialized division within Mexico’s National Electoral Institute (INE) would track the real-time origin of campaign and party financing, in coordination with the Financial Intelligence Unit (UIF), the CNBV, and international organizations. Undeclared or criminal-linked funding would lead to the automatic disqualification of candidates.

• Gradual Reassignment of Civilian Functions Under Military Control

Through a Strategic Functions Transition Law, control of civilian infrastructure (such as customs, ports, and railways) would be transferred from SEDENA (Mexican Ministry of National Defense) and SEMAR (Mexican Ministry of the Navy) to civilian agencies as soon as possible, under legislative oversight and audits by business chambers.

• National Protection System for Whistleblowers, Journalists, and Witnesses

Inspired by successful models such as Italy’s, this system would provide relocation, legal protection, and psychosocial support to individuals who report corruption or criminal activities linked to the state.

• Implementation of Anonymous Judges in High-Risk Criminal Cases

To safeguard judicial processes against retaliation from organized crime, the most sensitive cases involving collusion between state actors and criminal groups would be handled by anonymous judges, using encrypted identities and protected procedures—following precedents set in Colombia and Italy.

What Comes Next: Toward a Binational Security Framework

The designation of major cartels as Foreign Terrorist Organizations by the White House in January 2025 reflects mounting U.S. concern—but risks unintended consequences: violent retaliation, regional destabilization, and sovereignty disputes (White House, 2025).

To address this, a Binational Anti-Narcotics Task Force—anchored in mutual respect and legal clarity—should be established. It would include vetted units from both nations’ military and intelligence services, with operations strictly limited to dismantling cartel financial infrastructure, arms networks, and logistical corridors. Its scope must be publicly transparent and legally bounded.

Conclusion: Mexico Is Not Fighting a War—It’s Managing a Collapse

International pressure—including Washington’s calls for Mexico to prosecute corrupt politicians (Reuters, 2025)—is necessary but insufficient. The core issue is internal: without purging the political and military infrastructure that shields cartel activity, no amount of U.S. policy leverage will succeed.

The war on drugs has become a war of simulations. The cartels adapt, scale, and evolve. The Mexican state drifts. Unless structural reforms are enacted, supported by strategic international cooperation and a mobilized citizenry, the country is not resisting criminal domination—it is administering its own surrender.

Sources include CFR (2025), ACLED (2025), Diario de Yucatán (2025), NYT (2022, 2024), NPR (2022), Science (2023), BBC (2024), Freedom House (2025), Foreign Affairs (2025), Global Initiative (2025), and The White House (2025).