Diplomacy vs. Facts: The Rubio–Sheinbaum Accord and Its 4 Scenarios of Sovereignty or Submission

Trump governs with a Republican majority in Congress and with a more disciplined cabinet than in his first term.

By Ghaleb Krame and Raúl Flores

In his second term, Donald Trump has turned rhetoric into state policy with unprecedented bluntness. On January 20, 2025, during his inaugural address, he announced the designation of Mexican cartels as “foreign terrorist organizations” and declared a national emergency on the southern border, enabling the eventual mobilization of the military against them.

Weeks later, on February 18, 2025, at a conference in Florida, he was more explicit: “Mexico is largely governed by the cartels.” A description that, without saying it outright, amounted to calling the country a narco-state.

The context is clear: Trump governs with a Republican majority in Congress and with a more disciplined cabinet than in his first term. Teams dedicated to intelligence analysis took advantage of the information collected by the Biden administration during the transition and turned it into an arsenal of files on the cartels and their political protection networks. The result has been a redesign of the bilateral relationship with Mexico, in which diplomatic gestures always arrive after the show of force.

On this chessboard, Mexico appears more as a piece than as a player. President Claudia Sheinbaum has preferred a low and reactive profile, relying on Omar García Harfuch as her security operator before Washington, while minimizing the domestic costs of mass extraditions and financial sanctions. But the central dilemma cannot be hidden: is Mexico a sovereign partner or a subordinated ally in Trump’s strategy against the cartels?

I. Diplomacy vs. Facts

The real sequence has been pressure → concessions → “recognition.”

• Tariffs and commercial coercion. On February 1, 2025, the White House imposed a 25% tariff on imports from Mexico (and Canada) as a security tool linked to migration and fentanyl; it later adjusted the scheme in March and July. This commercial shift set the tone of the relationship and preceded Washington’s “recognition” of Mexican cooperation.

• Drones/ISR over Mexican territory. In February, Sheinbaum publicly admitted U.S. drone flights as part of a legal collaboration; days earlier she had attempted to downplay reports of covert operations. In August, specialized media documented MQ-9 missions that flew “deep into Mexico.” These facts contradict the narrative of “non-intervention,” even if the government insists it is regulated cooperation.

• Mass extraditions as political currency. The DOJ reported receiving 29 individuals from Mexico in late February and another 26 on August 13, covering crimes ranging from drug trafficking to kidnapping and homicide. These waves came at moments of peak tariff and security pressure from Washington and were immediately capitalized on by U.S. authorities as proof of results.

• Unprecedented financial sanctions against Mexican institutions. On June 25, FinCEN/Treasury identified two banks (CIBanco, Intercam) and one brokerage (Vector) as “primary laundering concerns” under new powers of the FEND Off Fentanyl Act, restricting transactions from the U.S. This was a sensitive milestone: a direct sanction on Mexico’s financial core. The Presidency demanded public evidence and questioned the basis, reflecting the asymmetry in the bilateral struggle.

• “Recognition” after the squeeze. After weeks of pressure (tariffs and the anti-fentanyl agenda), Rubio and other voices in Washington began to praise Mexican cooperation, though emphasizing that “more is needed” on drugs. At the same time, the Mexican government sought to close a security agreement before new tariff deadlines. The pattern confirms the thesis: applause only comes after leverage.

• Context of lists and ratings. Mexico appears, along with Venezuela, on the annual list of “major drug transit/producing countries” (FY2025). This is not legally equivalent to being a “failed state,” but it is a narrative anchor used from Washington to justify pressure instruments and conditional cooperation.

II. El Mayo: Prelude to the Agreement

• Capture and transfer. The sequence leading to the “Mayo case” began on July 25, 2024, when Ismael Zambada García was arrested upon landing in El Paso, Texas. Journalistic and defense reports suggest he was “lured under false pretenses” by Joaquín Guzmán López, son of El Chapo, aboard a Beechcraft that crossed the border.

• The guilty plea. On August 25, 2025, before Judge Brian M. Cogan in Brooklyn (EDNY), Zambada pleaded guilty to leading a Continuing Criminal Enterprise (CCE) and to RICO charges. He also agreed to the forfeiture of USD 15 billion and now faces life imprisonment without parole.

• Reactions in the U.S. In a subsequent press conference, Attorney General Pam Bondi called the ruling a “historic victory” and emphasized that Zambada “will spend the rest of his life in a U.S. federal prison.” DEA Administrator Terrance Cole underscored that “no cartel boss is beyond the reach of justice” and that the goal is to completely dismantle cartel networks.

• Response in Mexico. President Claudia Sheinbaum used the case to claim bilateral cooperation but questioned the bribery allegations: “Who was he paying?” She demanded formal evidence or complaints before proceeding in Mexico. In other public remarks, her team downplayed the internal political impact, requesting judicially admissible evidence before opening investigations.

• What the court said about harm and corruption. International coverage agrees that Zambada admitted decades of trafficking and corruption, accepting responsibility and acknowledging the harm done to both the U.S. and Mexico. The case record includes the narrative of payments to officials to guarantee protection.

Strategic reading (why this is the prelude to the agreement):

1. The confession and USD 15 billion forfeiture strengthened Washington’s thesis: tangible results (maximum sentences, massive asset seizure, cartel leadership neutralized) under U.S. jurisdiction. This raises the bar for any future security agreement with Mexico.

2. By admitting systemic corruption, the case increases pressure on Mexico City to deliver names and case files, or at least cooperate against protection networks. Otherwise, political space in the U.S. grows to toughen its stance (sanctions, legal designations, extraterritorial tools).

3. The capture, facilitated by an internal fracture within Sinaloa (as reported by Reuters/El País), shows that intra-cartel disruptions can create operational windows for the U.S. The message for Mexico: without robust internal processes, judicial milestones will continue to migrate to U.S. courts.

Breaking point for the “sovereignty” narrative.The fact that Sinaloa’s longest-serving capo was never tried in Mexico and ended up confessing in Brooklyn undermines the sovereignty narrative; at the same time, it legitimizes the “pressure-first, recognition-after” doctrine that frames the imminent Rubio–Sheinbaum agreement.

III. The Rubio–Sheinbaum Factor: 4 Possible Scenarios (Beyond the Narrative)

What is the U.S.–Mexico Security Agreement (Rubio–Sheinbaum Factor)?

In the first week of September 2025, Secretary of State Marco Rubio will visit Mexico City to sign a bilateral security agreement with President Claudia Sheinbaum. This pact seeks to address four main areas:

• Drug trafficking and transnational organized crime.

• Irregular migration and border management.

• Flows of chemical precursors for fentanyl.

• Armed violence, including firearms trafficked from the U.S. (which account for ~80% of the weapons in Mexico).

Sheinbaum has described it as being based on “sovereignty, mutual trust, territorial respect, and coordination without subordination.” However, negotiations have been discreet and with few details disclosed to the public. What is known points to:

• Real-time intelligence sharing.

• Coordinated interdiction of drugs and weapons.

• Joint arrests and accelerated extraditions.

• Financial sanctions against criminal networks.

The agreement arises after sharp tensions: Trump’s threats of 25–30% tariffs and financial sanctions on Mexican banks. Its signing could ease commercial pressure and serve as a bridge toward the 2026 review of the USMCA, which explains the pact’s strategic value.

Based on precedents like the Mérida Initiative (2008–2021), which evolved from unilateral assistance to cooperation, and the political risks of 2025 (e.g., USMCA review, midterm elections in Mexico), here four realistic scenarios are outlined. These include the previously presented “worst case” (selective amnesty) and an adversarial one where the U.S. prosecutes Mexican political actors. Each analyzes underlying facts (e.g., extradition data, financial flows) and potential repercussions.

The Rubio–Sheinbaum factor is pivotal because:
① Rubio embodies the Republican hard line (FTO designation, financial sanctions, extraterritorial pressure).
② Sheinbaum represents the continuity of Morena, with a sovereignist discourse but operational pragmatism (delegating to Harfuch).
③ The agreement is a pragmatic trade-off: economic relief and a tariff pause in exchange for security concessions.
④ The risk is that, beyond the narrative of “mutual cooperation,” every instance of non-compliance could activate the hard clauses (Scenario 3), leading to a regime-level political crisis in Mexico.

Conclusions

The Rubio–Sheinbaum agreement is presented as a diplomatic triumph, but in reality it constitutes an uneasy pact, full of ambiguities and deferred costs.

➢ The uneasy pact

• Mexico presents it as a framework of sovereignty and voluntary cooperation.
  b. The U.S. interprets it as the institutionalization of subordination: every clause, every concession (mass extraditions, financial sanctions, border deployments) reinforces the narrative that Mexico is incapable of managing its own security.
  c. Harfuch emerges as Washington’s trusted interlocutor, but at the cost of eroding Sheinbaum’s political legitimacy and sidelining the Ministry of the Interior.
  d. Morena, as the ruling party, comes under suspicion: if the agreement is perceived as hiding a “selective amnesty” to protect politicians, the risk is the consolidation of the narrative that the party functions as a narco-party.

➢ Domestic political costs

a. Presidential legitimacy: today Sheinbaum enjoys ~75% approval; but if secret clauses leak or excessive concessions are perceived, that legitimacy could quickly erode.
b. Cohesion of Morena: internal factions could accuse the president of surrender; others, of covering up complicity. The party could fracture before 2027.
c. Reputational risk: with El Mayo’s confession, the U.S. already has a narrative basis to investigate active politicians. Non-compliance could trigger Scenario 3 (selective prosecution and labeling of Morena).

➢ Future effects

a. Mexico 2027 – recall referendum: if Sheinbaum arrives weakened by leaks, sanctions, or accusations of subordination, the recall could become a plebiscite on her “submission” to Washington.
b. Mexico 2030 – presidential succession: Morena could face elections branded as a “narco-party,” with leaders under U.S. investigation or sanctioned by OFAC. A reorganized opposition would have fertile ground to capitalize on the wear and tear.
c. U.S. 2029 – presidential elections: for Trump, showcasing results (extradited capos, billions seized, militarized cooperation) will be a central argument for a possible re-election or to consolidate the Republican agenda. The failure of the agreement would serve as justification for more aggressive unilateral actions.

Final Reading
The uneasy pact between sovereignty in discourse and submission in practice becomes a turning point:
① If it works, Rubio and Sheinbaum will sell it as a new chapter of hemispheric cooperation, with immediate economic and political benefits.
② If it fails, it opens the door to an existential scenario: political prosecution, sanctions, bilateral rupture, and the labeling of Morena as a “narco-party.”
③ In any case, the agreement sets a precedent: the bilateral relationship will no longer be measured by diplomatic statements, but by verifiable facts of forced cooperation — with Mexico’s 2027 recall referendum and the U.S. 2029 presidential election as inevitable benchmarks.