Amalgamated Opposition in Washington: The External Rehearsal of a Domestic Strategy
Successful opposition in authoritarian contexts requires external validation.
By Ghaleb Krame
Mexico’s opposition has long been fragmented, discredited, and even infiltrated. But the ruling party’s increasingly punitive discourse and its systematic targeting of dissent—not just politicians, but also journalists, activists, business leaders, and ordinary citizens—is beginning to yield an unexpected boomerang effect: the emergence of martyr-like figures who gain legitimacy precisely through public vilification. What PAN, PRI, or MC failed to achieve independently is now being inadvertently catalyzed by Morena’s own persecution narrative: the forging of a common story among disparate dissenting voices.
In this new landscape, Washington is emerging as both an operational and symbolic point of convergence. It is there that conservative agendas, diplomatic networks, U.S. legislative actors, and think tanks are coming into contact with these newly invigorated Mexican opposition figures. The result is not a conventional coalition but a bilateral amalgam, with dual centers of gravity—one rooted in Mexican territory, the other embedded in the U.S. policy influence circuit.
If the ruling party continues down its path of censorship, intimidation, and criminalization of dissent, Morena will not only reinforce its internal narrative but also, unintentionally, give rise to a more professional, cross-cutting, and internationally connected opposition in the lead-up to Mexico’s decisive 2027 political cycle.
As the government brands all criticism as treason, a new opposition bloc is coalescing—not around ideology, but around a shared instinct for democratic survival. This opposition no longer operates solely in Mexico's legislative chambers but also across offices in the U.S. Capitol, think tank panels, and diplomatic channels in D.C. It is nourished by a narrative shaped by censorship, grievance, and the need for a strategic counterweight to an administration perceived as increasingly fortified yet isolated.
The real question is no longer whether the opposition will organize before 2027. It is whether the Sheinbaum regime can survive politically intact until then, as pressure mounts on two fronts: one internal and increasingly visible, the other external and progressively coordinated.
A Crescendo of Ungovernability?
The year 2027 will be pivotal, not just as the midpoint of President Claudia Sheinbaum’s term and the occasion for a potential recall referendum, but also as a litmus test of political legitimacy in a binational context. For the opposition, it presents the first electoral opportunity to measure Morena’s attrition. For the United States, 2027 kicks off a presidential election cycle where Mexico will return to center stage—over fentanyl trafficking, migration surges, cross-border violence, and regional instability.
These two timelines are converging. If Mexico's opposition gains traction, it will be seen in Washington as a credible interlocutor. Conversely, should a more hardline U.S. administration come to power—or if Republican majorities reshape Capitol Hill—the pressure on the Sheinbaum government may increase dramatically.
What now appears to be an improvised constellation of opposition actors could quickly solidify into a more structured opposition architecture, operating in unison across two capitals.
A Rapidly Eroding Mandate
President Sheinbaum’s political capital has deteriorated at an alarming rate. Accusations of cartel ties involving key figures from the AMLO-era cabinet—such as Adán Augusto López, Mario Delgado, Manuel Bartlett, Rubén Rocha Moya, Alfonso Durazo, and Américo Villarreal—have severely undermined the administration's attempt to project institutional renewal.
This is compounded by high-profile scandals that fly in the face of Morena’s austerity rhetoric: the overseas residence of Beatriz Gutiérrez Müller and her son in Spain, luxury watches flaunted by customs director Tonatiuh Márquez Hernández, and the opulent lifestyle of former President López Obrador’s sons, widely covered in investigative reporting.
Meanwhile, Mexico remains one of the world’s most violent countries. In just the first half of 2025, over 15,000 homicides were recorded. Mass graves in Jalisco, Veracruz, Guanajuato, Zacatecas, and Tlajomulco have exposed the state’s inability to reclaim territorial control or respond institutionally. Over 117,000 people are now officially disappeared, with no viable national search strategy or transitional justice process in place. Extortion, forced displacement, and criminal dominance of economic corridors are the norm.
Institutional Risk Becomes Systemic
The business environment has become increasingly unstable. Iberdrola's exit—beginning with the 2024 sale of 55% of its Mexican assets to the government and culminating in the 2025 divestiture of its remaining portfolio via Barclays—highlights growing regulatory and legal risks. Citibanamex exited retail banking altogether, while BBVA remains but faces warnings from credit agencies about overexposure to legal and financial volatility.
The U.S. Treasury Department has sanctioned three Mexican financial institutions—CIBanco, Intercam Banco, and Vector Casa de Bolsa—for laundering money for cartels including CJNG, Sinaloa, Gulf, and Beltrán Leyva. These cases involved fentanyl precursor payments from China and alleged bribes to ex-officials like Genaro García Luna.
Mexico responded with temporary interventions and fines exceeding 150 million pesos. Yet the perception persists that impunity and financial opacity are structural. Alfonso Romo's entanglements in protected economic networks only underscore this reality.
Doing business in Mexico is no longer just risky; it is ethically compromised and institutionally unpredictable.
Judicial Paralysis, Political Capture
The rule of law is collapsing. With less than 3% of disappearance cases judicialized and figures like Judge Isidro Avelar Gutiérrez sanctioned by the U.S. for alleged cartel ties, the public has lost faith in Mexico’s judiciary.
Sheinbaum's proposal to elect judges and magistrates via popular vote has triggered alarm. Far from democratizing justice, it aims to politicize and capture it. Oversight institutions such as ASF, INAI, and the INE have been either defunded or rendered inert. Regulatory bodies like COFECE, IFT, and CRE are now empty shells.
What is emerging is a centralized regime with minimal accountability and waning checks and balances.
Foreign Pressure, Regional Isolation
U.S.-Mexico tensions are growing. The Biden and Trump wings of Washington agree on one point: the Sheinbaum administration has not delivered on fentanyl control, anti-corruption efforts, or cartel containment. Calls to designate cartels as Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs) are gaining traction.
Regionally, Mexico has forfeited leadership to Brazil, Colombia, and Argentina. Its alignment with Venezuela, Cuba, and Nicaragua, combined with a reactive and ideologically blinkered foreign policy, has isolated it from democratic blocs and strategic forums.
As Mexico stares down the 2027 political gauntlet, it does so surrounded by mistrust abroad and paralyzed institutions at home.
A 90-Day Ultimatum, Not a Lifeline
In mid-2025, the U.S. granted Mexico a 90-day tariff suspension. It was not a gesture of support. It was a warning.
The Biden administration expects verifiable progress on border security, fentanyl interdiction, institutional resilience, and investor protections. If these fail to materialize, permanent tariffs and a reevaluation of bilateral cooperation are on the table. Mexico is not being tested as a trade partner. It is being tested as a state.
Venezuela First, Mexico Next?
The DEA’s record-high bounty for Nicolás Maduro in 2025 was no symbolic gesture. It aligns with the playbook for prior U.S. interventions: build narrative legitimacy, escalate diplomatically, then strike.
Venezuela is Washington’s proving ground—a soft target for projecting power ahead of the 2026 campaign. Trump, whose approval among Latinos hovers at 37%, may use Maduro as a springboard for a broader security narrative.
But should this fail to move the polls, Mexico could become the contingency plan. A precision drone strike, an intelligence leak linking high officials to organized crime, or a formal FTO designation could serve as the October surprise of 2026.
Venezuela is the rehearsal. Mexico is the main act.
The Final Variable: Leadership
Successful opposition in authoritarian contexts requires external validation. Washington is fast becoming the amplifier of last resort for Mexican dissent. From exiled journalists to conservative strategists, the capital is now the staging ground for a dual-front challenge.
Unlike 2018, when AMLO enjoyed goodwill across U.S. political lines, today the tone is different. Mexico is no longer perceived as a partner in need of reform. It is seen as a risk requiring containment.
But opposition without leadership cannot endure. Will a disenchanted business figure, a principled defector, or a survivor of Morena’s internal contradictions emerge to galvanize this growing network? Whoever it is, they will need dual legitimacy: resonance in the halls of Congress and credibility among Mexican voters.
The 90-day U.S. tariff reprieve is not a pause. It is a countdown. Venezuela is the signal. Mexico is the target. And 2027 is the reckoning.
What once seemed scattered is aligning. What once seemed improbable is becoming inevitable.